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1Abstract
W ee m b e ds i g n a l i n gi nt h ec l a s s i c a lC o u r n o tm o d e li nw h i c hs e v -
eral ﬁrms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known to all the
ﬁrms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting ﬁrms can ma-
nipulate the price to signal quality. Because there is only one price
in a market for a homogeneous good, each ﬁrm incompletely controls
the price-signal through the quantity decision. We characterize the
unique signaling Cournot equilibrium in which the price signals qual-
ity to the uninformed buyers. We then compare the signaling Cournot
equilibrium with the full-information Cournot equilibrium. Signaling
is shown to increase the equilibrium price. Moreover, under certain
conditions regarding the composition of buyers, the number of ﬁrms,
and the distribution of costs across ﬁrms, the eﬀects of signaling and
market externality cancel each other. In other words, the proﬁts un-
der signaling Cournot equal the proﬁts of a cartel in a full-information
environment.
Keywords: Cournot, Homogeneous good, Learning, Quality, Signal-
ing.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D21, D43, D82, D83, L15.
21 Introduction
Cournot’s 1838 model of ﬁrms’ strategic interactions is the foundation for
the analysis of imperfect competition, and has been widely used in a vari-
ety of ﬁelds in economics. One issue that arises in the Cournot model is
the informative role of prices. Previous studies have focused on the learning
activity of the ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, information ﬂows have been studied in
Cournot models of limit-pricing (Harrington, 1987), signal-jamming (Rior-
dan, 1985; Mirman et al., 1993), as well as experimentation (Mirman et al.,
1994). However, in a Cournot environment, existence and characterization of
the Cournot equilibrium remain open questions for the case in which the buy-
ers are uninformed and engage in learning through prices, i.e., price signaling
quality. Moreover, unlike previous signaling models done in the context of
price-setting ﬁrms (in monopoly or oligopoly), Cournot competition adds the
diﬃculty that there is only one market price and several ﬁrms, so that the
signal is partially controlled by each ﬁrm.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of signaling in the
classical Cournot model in which several ﬁrms sell a homogeneous good but
face heterogeneous costs. We assume that the quality of the product is
known to all the ﬁrms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting ﬁrms
manipulate the output, and, therefore, aﬀect the price in order to signal
quality. Because there is only one price in a market for a homogeneous
good, each ﬁrm incompletely controls the price-signal through the quantity
decision. In order to study the eﬀect of signaling on the Cournot equilibrium,
we retain a standard signaling framework with linear demand in which the
quality is related to the reservation price. See Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2005, 2007,
2008a,b), Janssen and Roy (2010), Caldieraro et al. (2011), Dubovik and
Jansen (2011), and Mirman and Santugini (2011).
We establish the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium in which the
price transmits information about the quality of the good to uninformed
buyers, hereafter referred to as a signaling Cournot equilibrium. While the
proof is speciﬁc to price signaling quality, it provides a basis for the existence
3of a signaling equilibrium in a Cournot framework, in which several ﬁrms
interact non-cooperatively to signal quality through one price. We assume
that quality is a continuum on the real positive line. This yields a unique
equilibrium in which every positive price is a possible outcome in equilib-
rium. Hence, out-of-equilibrium beliefs have no part to play in our analysis.
In the unique signaling Cournot equilibrium, signaling and exchanges both
occur when there are some informed buyers. However, if all buyers are unin-
formed, the price corresponding to the signaling Cournot equilibrium equals
the reservation price. While information is transmitted through the price,
the good is not purchased.
Next, we show that the signaling Cournot equilibrium cannot be the same
as the full-information Cournot equilibrium regardless of the composition of
buyers, the number of ﬁrms, the true quality of the good, and the distri-
bution of costs across ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, compared to the full-information
case, signaling induces the ﬁrms to reduce quantities, which increases the
price. This result is consistent with the monopoly case (Bagwell and Rior-
dan, 1991; Daughety and Reinganum, 2008a; Mirman and Santugini, 2011).
Moreover, our results are complementary to a similar result found for a sig-
naling Bertrand game with diﬀerentiated products. Indeed, Daughety and
Reinganum (2008b) show that signaling distorts the price upward when sub-
stitutability between diﬀerentiated products is suﬃciently small whereas we
show that it also applies for the case of perfect substitutability.
Finally, the eﬀect of signaling on quantities and price alters proﬁts. Specif-
ically, while the proﬁts of high-quality ﬁrms may increase in a diﬀerentiated-
good Bertrand model when all buyers are uninformed (Daughety and Rein-
ganum, 2008b), we ﬁnd that signaling increases proﬁts for all ﬁrms as long as
the fraction of informed buyers is not too low. For instance, if the ﬁrms face
no cost, then signaling increases proﬁts as long as the fraction of informed
buyers is greater than the inverse of the number of ﬁrms.1 The reason for
this increase is that signaling mitigates the negative eﬀect of the market
externality inherent in the Cournot equilibrium on the proﬁts of the ﬁrms.
1The positive eﬀect of signaling on proﬁts remains with cost. In fact, a higher cost
reduces the fraction of informed buyers needed to yield more proﬁts.
4Furthermore, signaling may cancel the negative eﬀect of the market exter-
nality. In other words, under certain conditions regarding the composition of
buyers, the number of ﬁrms, and the distributions of costs across ﬁrms, the
proﬁts under signaling Cournot equal the proﬁts of a cartel (or a monopolist)
in a full-information environment.
Note that an increase in proﬁts has also been found in Caldieraro et al.
(2011) in a price-setting and diﬀerentiated-product duopoly in which the frac-
tion of informed buyers is endogenized through the inclusion of a disclosure
technology.2 Caldieraro et al. (2011) show that, in a low-price separating
equilibrium regime, the low-quality ﬁrm has an incentive to disclose its qual-
ity prior to setting price so as to increase the fraction of informed buyers,
which leads to less price competition, and, thus, increases the proﬁts of the
low-quality ﬁrm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
characterizes the signaling Cournot equilibrium. In Section 4, we study the
eﬀect of signaling on the Cournot equilibrium. Finally, section 5 concludes
and suggests possible extensions.
2T h e M o d e l
In this section, we embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which
several ﬁrms sell a homogeneous good. We ﬁrst present the model in which
the price transmits information about the quality of the good to uninformed
buyers. We then deﬁne the Cournot equilibrium under both the (benchmark)
full-information and signaling environments.
Consider a market for a homogeneous good of quality θ ≥ 0s o l da tp r i c e
P. The demand side is composed of informed and uninformed price-taking
buyers. Informed buyers know θ and have demand qd
I = θ − P. Uninformed
buyers do not know θ, but infer the quality from observing the price.3 Speciﬁ-
2Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrms decide whether to incur an exogenous cost in
order to disclose quality through a trusted certiﬁcation party. The disclosure is observable
to a fraction of buyers who become informed prior to the ﬁrms setting prices in the second
stage.
3Let the prior beliefs about θ be summarized by the p.d.f. ξ(θ) with mean μ ≡
5cally, upon observing P, the uninformed buyers learn that the quality is χ(P),
where χ(P) is the inference rule representing posterior beliefs. The only dif-
ference between informed and uninformed buyers concerns information, and,
thus, the demand of the uninformed buyers is qd
U = χ(P) − P. Normalizing
the mass of buyers to one and letting λ ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of informed
buyers, the market demand is Qd = λqd
I +( 1− λ)qd
U,o r
Q
d = λ(θ − P)+( 1− λ)(χ(P) − P). (1)
The use of a demand that is linear in the price is standard in the signaling
literature. Moreover, the unknown quality is often related to the demand
intercept, i.e., the reservation or choke price. See Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2005,
2007, 2008a,b), Janssen and Roy (2010), Caldieraro et al. (2011), Dubovik
and Jansen (2011), and Mirman and Santugini (2011).4
The supply side is composed of J quantity-setting ﬁrms who know the
quality θ. The ﬁrms are heterogeneous because they face diﬀerent cost
functions. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm j produces quantity qj at the total cost cjθqj,
cj ∈ [0,1).5 The objective of each ﬁrm is to choose qj so as to maximize
proﬁt
πj = Pq j − cjθqj, (2)









In our model, the quality of the good is potentially undesirable. In other

θ≥0 ξ(x)dx.
4In Bagwell and Riordan (1991), quality can either be low or high. The demand for the
high quality is linear, while the low quality product has a unit demand. In Daughety and
Reinganum (2008a), the demand is QD =( α − (1 − δ)θ)/β − P/β,w h e r eα,β,δ > 0a r e
known parameters and θ ∈ [θ,θ] is the unknown parameter for which the price transmits
information. As in our case, the demand intercept depends on the unknown parameter.
5Quality is assumed exogenous. For quality-choice models, see Wolinsky (1983) and
the version by Tirole (1988, chap. 2.3.1.1), as well as Dubovik and Jansen (2011).
6words, in a full-information environment with λ =1 ,i fθ =0 ,t h e nn o
buyers wants to consume the good and the market does not exist. The zero
lower bound for quality implies that the ﬁrms are always at risk of having a
negative price-cost margin if the market is misperceived as selling the worst
possible quality.
Having described the set up, we now deﬁne the full-information and sig-
naling Cournot equilibrium. Since signaling is only relevant when there are
uninformed buyers, we refer to a signaling environment when λ ∈ [0,1).
The full-information environment applies when all buyers are informed, i.e.,
λ =1 .
Deﬁnition 2.1 presents the full-information Cournot equilibrium. If λ =1 ,
then, from (3), demand is P = θ −
J
j=1qj. The superscript C refers to
Cournot.6
Deﬁnition 2.1. A full-information Cournot equilibrium consists of ﬁrms’
strategies {qC
j (θ)}J





j (θ) = argmax
qj
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Next, we deﬁne the signaling Cournot equilibrium in which the price
signals quality. The ﬁrst two conditions are identical to the full-information
Cournot equilibrium except that demand depends on the inference rule. The
third condition is speciﬁc to the signaling environment and implies that the
equilibrium price is fully revealing about θ. The superscript SC refers to
signaling Cournot.7
6For the sake of brevity, we drop the letters FI for full-information.
7We do not analyze Cournot equilibrium in which the price is uninformative about
quality, hereafter a non-signaling Cournot equilibrium. Unless all buyers are uninformed
7Deﬁnition 2.2. For λ ∈ [0,1), a signaling Cournot equilibrium consists of
ﬁrms’ strategies {qSC
j (θ)}J
j=1,p r i c eP SC(θ), and inference rule χSC(P) such
that
1. Given {qSC
k (θ)}k =j and χSC(P),
q
SC


























j=1 and P SC(θ), χSC(P SC(θ)) = θ.
Before proceeding to the characterization of the equilibrium, a few com-
ments are in order. First, the signaling game in a Cournot model is slightly
diﬀerent from that studied in the literature. Signaling occurs when each
sender is in full control of the signal, e.g., a monopolist setting the price
(Bagwell and Riordan, 1991), or oligopolists selling diﬀerentiated products,
each setting his own price (Daughety and Reinganum, 2007, 2008b; Caldier-
aro et al., 2011). In a Cournot setting in which the ﬁrms sell the same good,
there is only one price. Hence, each ﬁrm incompletely controls the price,
and, thus, the signal. Information ﬂows in a Cournot setting have been pre-
viously studied in models of limit-pricing (Harrington, 1987), signal-jamming
(Riordan, 1985; Mirman et al., 1993), as well as experimentation (Mirman
et al., 1994). Unlike our model in which the uninformed buyers learn from
the price, these models consider situations in which the uninformed ﬁrms
extract information from the price. Regardless of the type of information
ﬂows, a common feature in these Cournot models is that the price-signal is
partially controlled by each ﬁrm.
Second, in the signaling Cournot model, ﬁrms face an informational ex-
ternality in addition to the usual market (or price) externality. Indeed, in
and the ﬁrms face no cost, a non-signaling Cournot equilibrium does not exist. See Ap-
pendix A.
8both the full-information and signaling Cournot models, each ﬁrm faces a
market externality because the proﬁt depends on the quantities of the other
ﬁrms through demand. In the signaling Cournot model, the additional in-
formational externality is due to the learning activity of the uninformed
buyers. Indeed, from (6), the inference rule χSC(·) alters the proﬁts of all
ﬁrms through demand.
3 The Cournot Equilibrium
Having presented the model, we now characterize the Cournot equilibrium.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst present the (benchmark) full-information Cournot equi-
librium, in which every buyer is informed about the quality, and, hence, the
ﬁrms do not face an informational externality. We then derive the signaling
Cournot equilibrium. In order to ensure that quantities are nonnegative in
both full-information and signaling environments, Assumption 3.1 holds for
the remainder of the paper.8
Assumption 3.1. For c ≡ max{ck}J
k=1, 1 − (1 + J)c +
J
k=1ck > 0.
Proposition 3.2 presents the strategies of the ﬁrms, aggregate output, and
the price in the full-information Cournot equilibrium. Although the price is
not used as a signal, it is informative about the quality, i.e., P C(θ)i sa n
increasing function of θ.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that all buyers are informed, i.e., λ =1 .T h e n ,
there exists a unique full-information Cournot equilibrium, in which, for all

















8Since cj ∈ [0,1) for all j, the condition stated in Assumption 3.1 always holds when
the ﬁrms face no cost or identical cost.








Proof. From (4), for all j, the proﬁt of ﬁrm j is strictly concave in qj,s o




k (θ) is the unique solution
to the ﬁrst-order condition θ − QC
−j(θ) − 2qj − cjθ =0 . 9 Solving the J
ﬁrst-order conditions for individual quantities yields (8). Summing (8) over
j yields (9). Plugging (9) into (5) where
J
j=1qC
j (θ) ≡ QC(θ) yields (10).
Since the best-reply for any ﬁrm has nonpositive slope larger than −1, the
Cournot equilibrium is unique.10
We next consider the signaling environment in which the price is used as
a signal by the uninformed buyers. Proposition 3.3 presents the strategies
of the ﬁrms and the price in the signaling Cournot equilibrium when some
buyers (but not all) are uninformed, i.e., λ ∈ (0,1).11 Note that the zero
lower bound along with the absence of an upper bound on θ removes the
need to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Indeed, in the unique signaling
Cournot equilibrium, every P ≥ 0 is a possible outcome in equilibrium.12
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that some buyers are uninformed, i.e., λ ∈ (0,1).
Then, there exists a unique signaling Cournot equilibrium, in which, for all




(1 − cj − BSC)(λ − BSC)
1 − BSC θ>0. (11)
Moreover, total supply is
J
k=1qSC




9Assumption 3.1 ensures an interior solution.
10For all j, from the ﬁrst-order condition, the best-reply of ﬁrm j is rj(QC
−j(θ)) =
((1 − cj)θ − QC
−j(θ))/2, so that r 
j(QC
−j(θ)) = −1/2.
11When all buyers are uninformed, there is no interior solution. The case of λ =0i s
handled separately in Remark 3.5.
12Note that, in Cournot, it is really the zero bound that removes the need to specify
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Indeed, suppose that θ ∈ [0,θ], then the fact that the ﬁrms





















such that BSC ∈ (0,min{1 − c,λ}), c ≡ max{ck}J
k=1.
Proof. The proof has three steps. First, we derive the unique aggregate out-
put QSC(θ) in a signaling equilibrium using best reply functions. Second,
given the unique aggregate output, we show that the price P SC(θ)a n di n f e r -
ence rule χSP(P) are unique. Third, given the unique aggregate output, we
show that the best reply function for any ﬁrm has nonpositive slope larger
than −1, i.e., there is a unique solution for each ﬁrm’s supply and, thus,
there exists a unique signaling Cournot equilibrium.
1. Aggregate Output in a Signaling Equilibrium. For θ>0a n d
λ ∈ (0,1), we can exclude the possibility of QSC(θ) = 0, and, thus,
focus on an interior solution when quality is positive, i.e., QSC(θ) > 0
for θ>0.
(a) Best Reply of Firm j in a Signaling Equilibrium. For all j,g i v e n




k (θ) is the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition correspond-

























qj + θ − qj − Q
SC
−j (θ) − cjθ =0 . (15)
To derive (15), we impose the equilibrium informational require-

















Next, diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to qj evaluated at Q−j =
QSC













It remains to characterize
dχSC(P)
dP . Here, the equilibrium inference
rule χSC(P) representing posterior beliefs is consistent with Bayes’
rule and the ﬁrms’ strategies, as in any signaling game. In other
words, χSC(P) is the inverse function of the equilibrium price
deﬁned by (7). Speciﬁcally, evaluating (3) at χSP(P SC(θ)) = θ
and
J




Using (18), for all P, the equilibrium inference rule χSC(P)=ψ
is implicitly deﬁned by





































Plugging (16) and (21) into (14) yields (15).
(b) Characterization of Unique Aggregate Output in a Signaling Equi-
12librium. We now derive the unique aggregate output given the















j=1cjθ =0 . (22)
To simplify notation, let y ≡ QSC(θ), y  ≡
dQSC(θ)
dθ ,a n dC ≡
J
k=1ck, so that (22) becomes
−
1 − y 
λ − y y + Jθ− Jy− Cθ =0 , (23)
which is a diﬀerential equation. Rearranging (23) yields
y
  =
(1 + λJ)y − λ(J − C)θ
(1 + J)y − (J − C)θ
. (24)
i. Valid Candidates for y. For θ>0, P SC(θ) ∈ [cθ,θ),c≡ mink{ck}.13
Hence, y ∈ (0,(1 − c)θ],θ > 0, which implies that the ini-
tial condition is (y0,θ 0)=( 0 ,0). Moreover, P SC(0) = 0 and
P SC(θ) is increasing in θ. Hence, since posterior beliefs are
the inverse of the price function, χSC(P) is increasing in P
with χSC(0) = 0, which implies, from (20), that y  < 1. Fi-
nally, demand must be decreasing for an interior solution to
exist, i.e., from (21), y  <λ .G i v e n t h a t y  <λ , it follows,
from (24) and the fact that λ<1, that, for θ>0, y<
(J−C)θ
1+J .










ii. Characterization of a Solution for y. We now show that y =
BSCθ,w h e r eBSC is deﬁned by (13) satisﬁes (23). Further-
13Suppose rather that P S(θ ) <c θ  for some θ  > 0. Then, no ﬁrm has an incentive to
produce, which is inconsistent with an interior solution for aggregate output.
14From Assumption 3.1, (J − C)θ/(1 + J) < (1 − c)θ for θ>0.
13more, we show that {θ,BSCθ}∈S. To see this, plugging




SCθ + Jθ− JB
SCθ −
J
k=1ckθ =0 , (26)

















The left-hand side of (27) is convex in x.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e
ck ∈ [0,1) for all k, it follows that J>
J
k=1ck, which implies






then the left-hand side of (27) is negative. Hence, the smallest
root of (27), deﬁned in (13), is the only root for BSC such that
{θ,BSCθ}∈S.
iii. Uniqueness of the Solution for y. Note that the right-hand side
and the derivative of the right-hand side of (24) are both con-
tinuous for (θ,y) ∈ S,w h e r eS is deﬁned by (25). By the
Fundamental Theorem of Diﬀerential Equation, there exists a
unique solution y = φ(θ) for any initial condition (θ0,y 0) ∈ S.
However, our initial condition (0,0) / ∈ S. Therefore, for
uniqueness, we need to show that there is no other y = φ(θ)
with initial condition (θ0,y 0) ∈ S\{θ,BSCθ} such that φ(0) =




(1 − λ)(J − C)θ
((J − C)θ +( 1+J)y)2 < 0 (28)
for (θ,y) ∈ S, which implies that any solution y = φ(θ)a b o v e
y = BSCθ has a ﬂatter slope and any solution y = φ(θ)
below y = BSCθ has a steeper slope. Hence, no solution
y = φ(θ),(θ,y) ∈ S \{ θ,BSCθ} converges toward the origin.
142. Equilibrium Price and Inference Rule. Given QSC(θ)a n dχSC(P SC(θ)) =













1 − BSC, (31)
which satisﬁes χSC(P SC(θ)) = θ.
3. Firms’ Strategies. Given χSC(P), the proﬁt of ﬁrm j is strictly
concave so that the best reply of ﬁrm j is the unique solution to (15).
Evaluating (15) at QSC(θ)=BSCθ and dQSC(θ)/dθ = BSC and solving





1 − cj − BSC	
λ − BSC	
θ
1 − BSC , (32)
for all j, as in (11). Recall that the left-hand side of (27) evaluated at
x = λ is strictly negative, so that BSC <λ . In addition, combining
Assumption 3.1 with the fact that BSC is increasing in λ,a n dt h a t
BSC|λ=1 =( J −
J
k=1ck)/(1 + J) implies that BSC < 1 − c, c ≡
max{ck}J
k=1.15 Hence, from (11), for all j, qj(θ) > 0.
4. Uniqueness of Signaling Cournot Equilibrium. Since QSC(θ)=
BSCθ is unique, (32) is unique. In other words, since the best re-
ply for any ﬁrm has nonpositive slope larger than −1, the signaling





15Note that the condition stated in Assumption 3.1 is only suﬃcient in a signaling
environment. In other words, a signaling environment allows for higher costs for all the
ﬁrms to supply the good. Indeed, from (11), it must be that BSC ≤ 1−c, c ≡ maxJ
k=1{ck}.






/(1 + J)a n dBSC is increasing in λ,t h e
condition stated in in Assumption 3.1 is necessary for λ = 1 and suﬃcient for λ ∈ (0,1).





















−j(θ)) ∈ (−1,0). Note that λ = 1 is consistent with Footnote 10.
Before proceeding with the eﬀect of signaling on the Cournot equilibrium,
three special cases are presented. First, evaluating the signaling Cournot
equilibrium at λ = 1 yields the full-information Cournot equilibrium. In
other words, for all j, qSC
j (θ)|λ=1 = qC
j (θ), and P SC(θ)|λ=1 = P C(θ). Second,
when cj =0f o ra l lj, (i.e., the ﬁrms are symmetric and consumer net sur-
plus is always non-negative), the signaling Cournot equilibrium has a simple
solution. Indeed, from (13), BSC|∀j,cj=0 = Jλ/(1 + J).







and the price is
P
SC(θ)=
(1 + (1 − λ)J)θ
1+J
. (36)
Third, in a signaling Cournot equilibrium, if the fraction of informed
buyers goes to zero, then the limiting price is equal to the reservation or
choke price, i.e., there is no interior solution. In other words, even though
the price signals quality, no exchanges occur in the market.
Remark 3.5. From (11) and (12), for all j, limλ→0qSC
j (θ)=0and
limλ→0 P SC(θ)=θ.
16The absence of informed buyers implies that proﬁt is independent of quality.
Moreover, proﬁt is always equal to zero, which is the proﬁt of the lowest
possible quality, i.e., θ = 0. Observe that the learning activity of the unin-
formed buyers induce the ﬁrms to set quantities to zero. Indeed, from (1),
in the absence of informed buyers, given the inference rule χSC(P)=P and
the strategies of the other ﬁrms, the best response for each ﬁrm is to set
quantity to zero. If there is a cost of production, producing would lead to
negative proﬁts. Without cost, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between producing or
not producing, as both yield zero proﬁt. Hence, not to produce is a weakly
dominant strategy. This result is not speciﬁc to the Cournot environment.
Mirman and Santugini (2011) show that, without informed buyers, the price-
setting monopolist generates no proﬁt regardless of the level of quality when
the lowest possible quality is zero. Our ﬁnding is in contrast to previous stud-
ies in monopoly and diﬀerentiated-good Bertrand models, in which proﬁts
are decreasing in quality (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Daughety and Rein-
ganum, 2005, 2008a,b). The diﬀerence in results is due to diﬀerent lower
bounds about quality.
4 The Eﬀect of Signaling
Using Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, we study the eﬀect of signaling on the
Cournot equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, we compare the strategies of the ﬁrms,
the price, as well as the proﬁts corresponding to the full-information and
signaling Cournot equilibrium.
4.1 Firms’ Strategies and Price
Proposition 4.1 states that, in a Cournot market with perfect substitutabil-
ity, signaling distorts the price upward through a decrease in the quantities
supplied. The reason is that signaling steepens the eﬀective demand curve,
which induces each ﬁrm to decrease quantity.16
16Note that QSC(θ)=BSCθ ∈ (0,λθ) is increasing in λ since ∂BSC/∂λ > 0. Hence,
from (21), signaling steepens the demand curve, i.e., the slope is smaller than −1.
17Proposition 4.1. If θ>0,t h e n ,f o ra l lj, qSC
j (θ) <q C
j (θ) and P SC(θ) >
P C(θ).





1+J . The left-hand side of (27) eval-
uated at x =
J
j=1βC
j is negative, which implies that the total quantity
supplied under signaling Cournot is less than the total quantity supplied
under full-information Cournot. In other words, BSC|λ∈[0,1) <B SC|λ=1.17
From (11) and (12), Proposition 4.1 follows immediately.
The increase in the price due to signaling is analogous to the monopoly
case (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Daughety and Reinganum, 2008a; Mirman
and Santugini, 2011). Moreover, Proposition 4.1 complements a similar result
found for a signaling Bertrand game with diﬀerentiated products (Daughety
and Reinganum, 2008b). Indeed, Proposition 3 in Daughety and Reinganum
(2008b) holds when substitutability between diﬀerentiated products is suf-
ﬁciently small, whereas our Proposition 4.1 applies for the case of perfect
substitutability.
In a signaling environment, the presence of informed buyers generates a
positive externality on the demand side. From Remark 3.5, the ﬁrms produce
only where there are informed buyers. Moreover, increasing the fraction of
informed buyers weakens the eﬀect of signaling, i.e., production is increased,
which reduces the market price.
Proposition 4.2. If θ>0,t h e n ,f o ra l lj, ∂qSC
j (θ)/∂λ > 0 and ∂PSC(θ)/∂λ <
0.
Proof. From (11), (12) and (13), ∂qSC
j (θ)/∂λ > 0a n d∂PSC(θ)/∂λ < 0.
Note that Proposition 4.2 is consistent with other studies on the informa-
tional role of prices (Wolinsky, 1983; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Mirman and
Santugini, 2011).18 As noted, an increase in the fraction of informed buyers
ﬂattens the demand curve, which leads to a lower market price. On the other
17Recall that we can calculate variables of the full-information Cournot equilibrium by
evaluating the signaling Cournot equilibrium at λ =1 .
18See also Tirole (1988, chap. 2.3.1.1).
18hand, Anderson and Renault (2000) shows, in a search model with informa-
tion acquisition, that the informed buyers generate a negative externality on
the demand side. In Anderson and Renault (2000), the mass of informed
buyers are the source of inelasticity, which implies that the more informed
buyers, the higher the price. This diﬀerence with our result depends on the
way information acquisition is modeled.
4.2 Proﬁts
Next, we consider the eﬀect of signaling on proﬁts πj = Pq j −cjθqj.I no r d e r
to clarify the analysis, we begin with the case in which the cost is zero, i.e.,
cj =0f o ra l lj. We then study separately the cases of homogeneous cost
(i.e., cj = c for all j), and heterogeneous cost.
No Cost. From Remark 3.4, if cj =0f o ra l lj, then the proﬁt of a ﬁrm




(1 + (1 − λ)J)λθ2
(1 + J)2 . (37)






(1 + J)2. (38)
Proposition 4.3 provides the condition for which signaling strictly in-
creases the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. While the proﬁts of high-quality ﬁrms may in-
crease in a diﬀerentiated-good Bertrand model when all buyers are unin-
formed (Daughety and Reinganum, 2008b), we ﬁnd that, in the Cournot
model, signaling increases proﬁts as long as the fraction of informed buyers
is not too low. The condition stated in Proposition 4.3 is found by compar-
ing (37) and (38).19
19In a two-stage game in which price-setting ﬁrms decide whether to disclose quality
in the ﬁrst stage (which determines the fraction of informed buyers), and then compete
in price in the second stage, Caldieraro et al. (2011) show that, in a low-price separating
equilibrium regime, the low-quality ﬁrm has an incentive to disclose its quality prior to
setting price so as to increase the fraction of informed buyers, which leads to less price
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Figure 1: The Eﬀect of Signaling on Proﬁts without Cost
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that cj =0for all j.T h e n , f o r λ ∈ [0,1) and
θ>0, πSC
j (θ) >π C
j (θ) if and only if 1/J < λ < 1.
From Proposition 4.3, the number of ﬁrms and the fraction of informed
buyers are both determinants of the eﬀect of signaling on proﬁts. Speciﬁcally,
the higher the number of ﬁrms, the lower the fraction of informed buyers
required to obtain higher proﬁts under signaling. Figure 1 depicts the eﬀect of
the fraction λ of informed buyers on the ratio of signaling to full-information
proﬁts. Consistent with Proposition 4.3, signaling strictly increases proﬁt
for all suﬃcient high levels of informed buyers, i.e., πSC
j (θ)/πC
j (θ) > 1w h e n
λ ∈ (1/J,1).
Next, Proposition 4.4 states that when the eﬀect of signaling is strongest
(i.e., at λ = λ∗ in Figure 1), there is no market externality. That is, the
maximum proﬁts for each ﬁrm under a signaling Cournot equilibrium, ob-
tained at λ = λ∗, is equal to the proﬁts corresponding to the ﬁrms’ share in
a full-information cartel.
20Proposition 4.4. Suppose that cj =0for all j.T h e n ,f o rθ>0, πSC
j (θ)=
(πC






Proof. Evaluating (38) at J = 1 and dividing by J yields the proﬁt of a
ﬁrm participating in a cartel in a full-information environment, i.e.,
θ2
4J.S e t -
ting (38) equal to θ2
4J and solving for λ ∈ [0,1] yields (39). Moreover, us-
ing (37) and (38), πSC
j (θ)/πC
j (θ)=( 1+( 1− λ)J)λ attains the maximum
when λ is equal to (39).
Before proceeding with the case of homogeneous and heterogeneous cost,
we make two further remarks. First, while informed buyers always generate
a positive externality on the uninformed buyers (through a lower price), the
eﬀect on proﬁts is ambiguous. Indeed, from (37), πSC
j (θ) is concave in the
fraction of informed buyers, proﬁts under signaling is concave in λ. While
more informed buyers reduces the usual price distortion in a signaling game,
thereby increasing proﬁts, an increase in the fraction of informed buyers also
yields more competition, which reduces proﬁts. The two eﬀects pull in oppo-
site directions and the overall eﬀect depends on the value of λ. Speciﬁcally,
an increase in the fraction of informed buyers increases proﬁts under signaling
if and only if λ<λ ∗.
Second, from (37) and (38), signaling alters the eﬀect of Cournot com-
petition on proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, signaling mitigates the negative impact of
Cournot competition on proﬁts, i.e., ∂πC
j (θ)/∂J < ∂πSC
j (θ)/∂J < 0f o r
λ ∈ [0,1) and θ>0. Under signaling, the eﬀect of competition on prof-
its is two-fold. First, more ﬁrms decreases proﬁts directly, which is the usual
eﬀect also found in the full-information environment. This partial eﬀect is
captured through the denominator of (37). Second, an increase in J increases
proﬁts through the nominator of (37), as long as there are uninformed buyers,
i.e., λ ∈ [0,1). This is the indirect eﬀect of competition on proﬁts through
signaling. This indirect eﬀect arises because the learning activity of some of
the buyers alters the demand, which induces each ﬁrm to decrease quantity,
21thereby reducing the negative eﬀect of the market externality on proﬁts.20
Homogeneous Cost. We next show that the results stated in Proposi-
tions 4.3 and 4.4 are robust to the presence of cost. Proposition 4.5 provides
the condition for which signaling strictly increases the proﬁts of all ﬁrms.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that cj = c for all j.T h e n , f o r λ ∈ [0,1) and
θ>0, πSC
j (θ) >π C
j (θ) if and only if21
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Proof. From (8) and (10), πC
j (θ)|∀j,cj=c =
(1−c)2θ2




1−BSC|∀j,cj=c θ2,w h e r eBSC|∀j,cj=c is deﬁned
in (41). Comparing πC
j (θ)|∀j,cj=c and πSC
j (θ)|∀j,cj=c yields (40).
Because condition (40) is diﬃcult to analyze, we proceed with a graph-
ical analysis. Figure 2 provides a contour plot of the ratio of signaling to
full-information proﬁts of a ﬁrm for values of the composition of buyers and
the common cost when there are J = 4 ﬁrms. In other words, the lines on
the graph are equal-value lines. They represent the combination of values of
λ and c for which the ratio πSC
j (θ)/πC
j (θ) is the same. We make two observa-
tions. First, consistent with Proposition 4.5, signaling increases proﬁts (i.e.,
πSC
j (θ)/πC
j (θ) ≥ 1) when the fraction of informed buyers is not too low.22
20Speciﬁcally, from (21), ∂P/∂qj = −(1+(1−λ)J)/λ. Hence, more competition via an
increase in J steepens the demand, which induces the ﬁrms to decrease quantities.
21Note that condition (40) holds in general, i.e., for diﬀerent cost.
22Note that, using (40), signaling increases proﬁts as long as BSC ∈ (0,x), where x is
the solution to
− (1 + J)2x3 +( 2 ( 1− c)+λ)(1 + J)2x2
+( 1− c − (1 − c +2 λ)(1 + J)2)(1 − c)x + ((1 + J)2λ − 1)(1 − c)2 =0 . (42)




































Figure 2: The Eﬀect of Signaling on Proﬁts with Homogeneous Cost, J =4
The necessity for a high enough fraction of informed buyers is consistent with
Remark 3.5. Indeed, as limλ→0 πSC(θ) = 0, while πC(θ) > 0 is independent of
λ. Second, an increase in the cost relaxes the constraint, i.e., a lower number
of informed buyers is needed to yield an increase in proﬁts under signaling.
Note that these two observations hold regardless of the number of the ﬁrms
in the market, although an increase in competition strengthens the positive
eﬀect of signaling on proﬁts. See Figure 4 in Appendix B.
The result stated in Proposition 4.4 remains true with the inclusion of
cost. However, the optimal composition of buyers λ∗ does change with cost.
Indeed, Figure 3 shows that for any c ∈ [0,1), there exists a composition of
buyers such that signaling Cournot proﬁts equal the full-information cartel
proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, the lines in Figures 3a and 3b represent the pair {λ,c}
for which full-information cartel proﬁts are reached in a market with 2 and 3
(0,x)i st h a tx>0, which occurs when (1 + J)2λ − 1 > 0o rλ>1/(1 + J)2. Hence,
even in the presence of cost, the fraction of informed buyers cannot be too low in order
for signaling to increase proﬁts.
23λ
c




























Figure 3: Full-Information Cartel Proﬁts
ﬁrms, respectively. A higher cost requires a lower number of informed buyers
in order to reach such proﬁts.
Heterogeneous Cost. The results stated in Propositions 4.3 and 4.5
continue to hold when the ﬁrms are asymmetric. Figures 5 and 6 in Ap-
pendix B provide a contour plot of the ratio of signaling to full-information
proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 for values of the composition of buyers and the cost of ﬁrm
1, given the competition and the cost structure of the other ﬁrms. In other
words, the lines on the graph are equal-value lines. They represent the com-
bination of values of λ and c1 for which the ratio πSC
j (θ)/πC
j (θ)i st h es a m e .
Hence, given Proposition 4.3, the curve for which πSC
j (θ)/πC
j (θ)=1h i t st h e
λ-axis at 1/J (i.e., when the cost is zero for all ﬁrms) for Figures 5b and 6b.
Figure 5 considers the case of a market with two ﬁrms in which ﬁrm 1 has
the lowest cost (Figure 5a) or has the highest cost (Figure 5b).23 Figure 6
repeats the analysis for the case of three ﬁrms, two of which are identical. In
23In order for Assumption 3.1 to hold for J ∈{ 2,3}, cj ∈ [0,0.25] for all j.
24both cases, signaling might increase proﬁts, i.e., πSC
j (θ)/πC(θ)j > 1.
5F i n a l R e m a r k s
This paper applies the analysis of information ﬂows in a Cournot equilib-
rium with heterogeneous ﬁrms (through the cost) to the case of uninformed
buyers extracting information from the price. In a Cournot model with a
homogeneous good, each ﬁrm incompletely controls the price, and, thus, the
signal. We show that there exists a unique signaling Cournot equilibrium,
in which the behavior of the ﬁrms is altered and proﬁts may increase along
with an increase in the fraction of uninformed buyers. Moreover, under con-
ditions regarding the composition of buyers, the number of ﬁrms, and the
distribution of costs, signaling and the market externality pull in opposite
directions and cancel each other out. In other words, there are conditions
under which the proﬁts under signaling Cournot equal the proﬁts of a cartel
in a full-information environment. The fact that asymmetric information in
a non-cooperative game yields the cartel outcome is of interest in itself and
should be investigated in other models of strategic interaction.
In order to study signaling in Cournot competition, we have focused on a
noiseless environment. Indeed, there is no uncertainty in our model beyond
the unknown quality. Extending the study of the signaling role of prices to a
noisy environment would lessen the informational requirement of uninformed
buyers about the structure of the market. It would also further our under-
standing of signaling in a dynamic model. In particular, in a dynamic context
with repeated purchases, the presence of noise implies that the buyers’ beliefs
about quality evolve due to information acquisition not only from observing
prices, but also from past consumption, which may lead to passive learning
or experimentation. How the presence of diﬀerent sources of information
(e.g., price and experience) aﬀects the behavior of the ﬁrms is a question left
for future research. Indeed, combining experimentation (Grossman et al.,
1977; Aghion et al., 1991; Fusselman and Mirman, 1993) or passive learning
(Koulovatianos et al., 2009) with signaling could further our understanding
on how diﬀerent types of learning aﬀect the information role of price.
25How buyers form their beliefs could also be studied in a noiseless en-
vironment through the endogenization of the fraction of informed buyers.
Speciﬁcally, in a two-period model, all the buyers are uninformed in the ﬁrst
period and purchase the good based on their prior beliefs. The buyers who
purchase the good learn from experience and become informed in the second
period, which then determines the fraction of informed buyers.24 In period 2,
the ﬁrms set quantities given the composition of the buyers as in our paper.25
Another approach suggested by Caldieraro et al. (2011) in a price-setting and
diﬀerentiated-product duopoly is to endogenize the fraction of informed buy-
ers through the inclusion of a disclosure technology. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst
stage, the ﬁrms decide whether to incur an exogenous cost in order to disclose
quality through a trusted certiﬁcation party. The disclosure is observable to
a fraction of buyers who become informed prior to the ﬁrms setting prices in
the second stage.
24This approach would also bring forward-looking behavior on the part of both the ﬁrms
and the consumers.
25In addition to price and own experience, the uninformed buyers can learn from past
aggregate sales, as in Caminal and Vives (1996).
26A Non-Signaling Cournot Equilibrium
In this appendix, we consider the existence and characterization of a Cournot
equilibrium in which the price is uninformative about quality. Such equilib-
rium is hereafter referred to as a non-signaling Cournot equilibrium.
Deﬁnition A.1 presents the non-signaling Cournot equilibrium in which
the price transmits no information about quality, and, thus, the uninformed
buyers revert to their prior mean beliefs μ ≥ 0 for any P. The superscript
NSC refers to non-signaling Cournot.
Deﬁnition A.1. For λ ∈ [0,1), a non-signaling Cournot equilibrium consists
of ﬁrms’ strategies {qNSC
j (θ)}J
j=1,p r i c eP NSC(θ), and inference rule χNSC(P)
such that
1. Given {qNSC
k (θ)}k =j and χNSC(P),
q
NSC



























j=1 and P NSC(θ), χNSC(P NSC(θ)) = μ.
Proposition A.2 states the conditions for the existence of a non-signaling
Cournot equilibrium.
Proposition A.2. There exists a non-signaling Cournot equilibrium if and
only if λ =0and cj =0for all j.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists in general a non-signaling
Cournot equilibrium. Given {qNSC




j (θ) = argmax
qj







qj − cjθqj. (45)










and the price is
P
NSC(θ)=







If λ ∈ (0,1) or ck  =0f o rs o m ek, then (47) is increasing in θ, and, thus,
informative about quality. However, if λ =0a n dck =0f o ra l lk,t h e na
non-signaling Cournot equilibrium exists as the price is indeed uninformative
about quality.
28BF i g u r e s
Figure 4 provides a contour plot of the ratio of signaling to full-information
proﬁts of a ﬁrm for values of the composition of buyers and the common
cost under diﬀerent levels of competition, J ∈{ 2,4,8,16}. Figures 5 and 6
provide a contour plot of the ratio of signaling to full-information proﬁts of
ﬁrm 1 for values of the composition of buyers and the cost c1 under diﬀerent












































































































































































































Figure 6: The Eﬀect of Signaling on Proﬁts with Cost, J =3
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